In many everyday decisions, people quickly integrate noisy samples of information to form a preference among alternatives that offer uncertain rewards. Here, we investigated this decision process using the Flash Gambling Task (FGT), in which participants made a series of choices between a certain payoff and an uncertain alternative that produced a normal distribution of payoffs. For each choice, participants experienced the distribution of payoffs via rapid samples updated every 50 ms. We show that people can make these rapid decisions from experience and that the decision process is consistent with a sequential sampling process. Results also reveal a dissociation between these preferential decisions and equivalent perceptual decisions where participants had to determine which alternatives contained more dots on average. To account for this dissociation, we developed a sequential sampling rank-dependent utility model, which showed that participants in the FGT attended more to larger potential payoffs than participants in the perceptual task despite being given equivalent information. We discuss the implications of these findings in terms of computational models of preferential choice and a more complete understanding of experience-based decision making.
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Introduction
Imagine you are a day trader deciding whether or not to buy a stock. To make a choice, you watch market data moving along LED ribbons around trading floors or at the bottom of computer monitors trying to gauge the price trend. The information flows by in real time so to decide if the market is trending up or down you have to quickly integrate the information racing by. How does the day trader make this preferential choice where there is not an objectively correct answer, but instead where the choice is based on some subjective value of the alternatives? One reasonable hypothesis is that the day trader makes a decision using a sequential sampling process (Busemeyer & Townsend, 1993; Usher & McClelland, 2004) . During this process, as decision makers deliberate, they sequentially sample payoff information about the possible alternatives -either directly from the alternatives or from their memory of past experience with the alternatives -and integrate that information over time. Once a threshold of evidence is reached a decision is made accordingly.
Despite the plausibility of this sequential sampling hypothesis, we do not know how well decision makers integrate rapid samples of payoff information, which is a critical assumption of the process. More generally, it is an open question how well a sequential sampling process describes choices when decision makers have to rapidly process payoff information as in the case of our day trader. Most of the empirical work to date on risky decision making has focused on how people choose between monetary lotteries that are presented as static, symbolic descriptions of the payoffs and probabilities (i.e., decisions from description) (Weber, Shafir, & Blais, 2004) . Other studies have used the so-called decisions-from-experience paradigm where participants explicitly sample from the alternatives and http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2013.12.012 0010-0277/Ó 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
